The Effects of Opponent’s Information, Repeated Collaboration and Task Structure on Centipede Decision Making
|關鍵字:||蜈蚣賽局;決策之作業結構;重複合作;對手資訊;centipede game;decision making;task structure;repeated Collaboration;Opponent’s Information|
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of opponent’s information, repeated collaboration and task structure on Centipede decision making. Ninety-four college students were randomly paired into groups to participate in 50 Centipede games. The games were composed by 2 (stories: third party involved or not) × 2 (long or short game) × 2 (high or low payoffs) × 3 (levels of bilateral benefit difference: increasing, constant, decreasing) × 2 (opponent’s information provided or not). Half of dyads were told that they would play with the same partner twice in the games, while the other half were told that they played with different partner on each game. Results showed that games involved third-party benefit, longer relationship, lower payoff, increasing bilateral benefit, or with opponent’s information, were ended later, indicating greater cooperation between the two players. The interaction effect further showed that repeated collaboration with a partner would prolong the game only if it involved third-party benefit. In addition, opponent’s information might increase cooperation only on games with low payoffs. These findings suggest that high personal payoffs of a game may undermine participant’s tendency to cooperate.