Effect of securities firms’ internal auditor system on the internal control performance
|關鍵字:||證券商;內部稽核制度;內部控制制度;內部控制績效;securities firms;internal auditor system;internal control system;internal control performance|
Before 2002, the internal auditors in securities firms’ branch should hold their positions on a full-time basis, which meant auditing business activities should not be concurrently engaged in by other associated persons and we called such system “full-time internal auditor system.” In 2002, an alternative system was opened to adopt, ”part-time internal auditor system”, which meant auditing business activities in securities branches were allowed to be concurrently engaged in by other associated persons. However, these years the securities firms that adopted part-time internal auditor system have being had material failures of their internal auditing operations. The main purpose of this research is to find if there is any difference of the internal control performance between securities firms adopting full-time internal auditor system and part-time internal auditor system. And we hope the research will be useful to the supervisory authority and the Self-Regulatory Organizations, such as Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, for promulgating and amending regulations regarding internal auditing of securities firms. Based on the material we collecting and after the qualitative and quantitative analysis, this research concludes results and provides concrete suggestions as follows: 1.results (1)Compared to part-time internal auditor system, the effect of full-time internal auditor system on internal control performance is more positive. (2)The factor of main consideration of securities firms’ choosing internal auditor system is the cost of personnel. 2.suggestions (1)Increase responsibility and add more power to internal auditors instead of increasing legalized audited items. (2)It’s not to increase the burden of the internal auditors in head office of securities firms on auditing the branches; increase responsibility of the chairman of the board, CEO, and the internal auditor officer of the head office instead.
|Appears in Collections:||Thesis|