標題: 資金取得機會對投資意願與經營績效之影響:台灣實證
The Effect of Capital Acquisition Opportunity on Investment Incentive and Business Performance: Evidence from Taiwan
作者: 陳秀華
Shiu-Hua Chen
洪志洋
Dr. Chih-Young Hung
科技管理研究所
關鍵字: 代理問題;過度投資;投資;經營績效;agency problem;over-invest;investment;business performance
公開日期: 2004
摘要: 依據Fama and Miller(1972)在其所著的財務理論一書提到,公司的目標就是在符合社會倫理道德的規範下,使公司價值極大化;在不考慮代理問題的情況下,正常理性的投資決策應可增加公司的價值,因此公司經理人可以透過不斷地投資來增加公司的價值。然而Jensen在1986年提出了「過度投資」的問題,其認為若公司存在著代理問題,則公司經理人與股東之利益將產生衝突,使得管理者不再以股東財富極大化為目標。因此,當管理當局所控制的自由現金流量(Free Cash Flow)愈大時,愈有可能投資淨現值小於零的投資計劃,進而降低公司的價值,此時投資愈大,反而會使得公司價值愈低。Titman, Wei and Xie則在1999年利用特徵模型與因子模型來驗證Jenson在1986年所提出的觀點,實證結果顯示在資金籌措相對容易之情況下,企業反而出現過度投資現象,導致公司價值下跌,進而使得股東財富受損。 本研究將運用迴歸方法進行實證分析,探討當企業資金籌措過於容易,是否會影響其投資之行為,進而導致公司經營績效相對不佳。希望藉此喚醒投資人、產業及企業政策制定者,能夠從企業價值來看待企業、投資企業。實證結果顯示,資金取得機會對企業投資意願有顯著正向的影響,而且,在企業資金取得機會有別情況下,其投資意願與經營績效之關係有顯著之差異,亦即資金取得機會較佳之企業會降低投資意願對經營績效正向之影響。
According to Fama and Miller (1972), the goal of firm is to maximize the firm’s value under the social ethics and law. Excluding agency cost, rational investment decision can increase firm’s value. So managers can increase firm’s value by unceasingly investing. But Jensen (1986) reported that managers of firms with agency problem are involved non-value-maximizing activities, that is, there are severe conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. Therefore, the more free cash flow manager can control, the more possible to invest the project with NPV smaller than zero. As a result, the firm’s value will be reduced. Titman, Wei and Xie in 1999 used the characteristic-based model and the factor-based model to test the Jensen’s viewpoint that was proposed in 1986. The empirical results show that when the firm raises fund too easily, it is more likely to over-invest and then to endanger the shareholder’s benefit. The study uses regression analysis to discuss when the firm raises fund too easily, it maybe affect the firm’s investment behavior and then causes the firm performance relatively worse. The author hopes to awaken investors, policy makers of industry and firms to invest other firms from the firm’s value. The study reports that firm’s capital acquisition opportunity is positive significantly related to firm’s investment incentives. And those firms with better capital acquisition opportunities tends to receive worse business performance in responses to increase firm’s investment incentives.
URI: http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT009235526
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/77216
Appears in Collections:Thesis