On the Conception of Property and Territorial Logic ¬－ Retracing Zhu Qianzhi’s thought from 1920 to 1925
Lin, Feng Liang
Joyce C.H. Liu
|關鍵字:||朱謙之;所有權的邏輯;認識的實證化;無的哲學;情的辯證性;認識的解放性;Zhu Qianzhi;the logic of property;Positivist Knowledge;the philosophy of nothingness;dialectical thought of Qíng;the emancipation of knowledge|
Anchored in his thought from 1920 to 1925, my dissertation probes into Zhu Qianzhi's problematic conception of property, and accordingly attempts to re-intervene and re-articulate the cultural discourses in Zhu's contemporary. Revisiting this duration of his developing contexts questioning on the concept of property, we will see, on the one hand, how Zhu, after WWI, tries to examine the epistemic limit of the knowledge brought about by the Enlightenment. On the other hand, we are also going to witness how Zhu takes Buddhism, Lao Zi and Confucianism as intellectual resources to undo the epistemic fixation of the ideological subjective closure. According to Zhu's analysis of property, we are able to find out that the Chinese revolutionary discourses, induced by either the western democratic ideas or the Soviet State paradigm, or even those of New Nationalism praised by some members of Young China Association, have already hold an positivist assumption for purpose of structuring different subjects and the worlds we live into the sameness. It is hardly to neglect that this positivist vision is indeed the compulsive energy enhancing the limited logic of ownership. Therefore, when revisiting the world situation that China confronted with after WWI, we will find that the positivist schema of property at developmentalist request is the historical scene continually contemplated by Zhu. Precisely, in accordance with the cultural translation, the political set-up and the resonance in mode of production of knowledge, this dominated epistemic structure does not only legitimize the governmentality as the blueprint for subjects’ self construction, but also, via the relations of regional competition, it continues reinforcing the logic of consensus that distributes the inside-outside and distinguishes the different from the same. Nevertheless, starting from the discourses and the intellectual disputes of property that Zhu has engaged in, we would be able to acquire the nuanced intellectual situation at that age, and to re-assess how Zhu examines these difficult problems. Surrounding his conception of property, this research will also focus on how Zhu explores the possibilities of dynamic force of thought from the intellectual resources of Buddhism, Lao Zi and Confucianism when arguing against the epistemic limit of positivist assumption. One of the main threads of Zhu's thought extended via the Buddhism and Lao Zi is based on the proposition of “nothingness.” In his understanding, Zhu suggests that "nothingness" means to unfasten the binding between signifier and signified. Thus, what Zhu would like to elaborate could be that "nothingness" would bring about the moment to loosen the represented mode of subject and object; furthermore, the “nothingness” might be itself the act of letting the abilities of thought and intervention be able to come into the appearance. Along with the conception of "nothingness", Zhu probes into Confucianism notion of “情” (qíng). Zhu's investigation of “情” (qíng) might depict the rather profound movement of dialectical forces of thought. In his argument, Zhu inaugurates his thinking from「物」(the thing) 之「離麗」（abilities of departure）and brings together the discussion of 「卦、彖、爻、辭、象」 in 《周易》. Through his elaboration, this research would like to argue that Zhu might suggest a particular kind of dialectical movement of thought, of which it brings about the constant force of departure. That is to say, the thing obtains its abilities of departure throughout the dialectical movement; furthermore, it is the starting point of the singular process of subjectivation as well as the emancipatory moment of knowledge. In this research, I will discuss the logic of property and its epistemic limit along with Zhu Qianzhi’s thought from 1920 to 1925. When confronting the global distribution and the competitive mode of regions, through his problematization of concept of property, Zhu might suggest: how could it be possible that the different subjects were not being counted into the sameness dominated by the logic of consensus? By which way the subject can unfold the identified mode and meanwhile connect with each other in multiple ways? Also, how could we transform the given epistemic structure and to bring out the spaces of possibilities, or say, the ways to emancipation?