Managerial Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
|關鍵字:||代理理論;管理者持股;公司績效;技術效率;總要素生產力;存活分析;Agency Theory;Managerial Ownership;Firm Performance;Technical Efficiency;Total Factor Productivity;Survival Analysis|
|摘要:||本論文係根據Jensen and Meckling (1976) 的代理理論，探討台灣上市上櫃公司之管理者股權結構對於公司經營績效的影響。以往之研究多僅專注於財務績效指標之探討，且未對管理者持股進行分項。本研究將廣義的管理者股權（內部人持股）依持有者身分之不同與其資訊不對稱之程度，進一步區分為經理人持股、董監事持股及大股東持股。至於公司績效，本研究分別針對財務績效（Tobin’s Q、資產報酬率），經濟績效（技術效率、總要素生產力），及存活時間等三大類績效指標，進行管理者持股對於公司經營績效之分析。
Based on the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), how managerial ownership structure affects firm performance in Taiwan is explored in this study. Prior studies have mostly focused on the financial performance measures and have never taken the composition of managerial ownership into account. In this study, insiders (the broad definition of management) have been classified into executives, board members and large shareholders according to a hierarchy of asymmetric information. This study also examines the relation between managerial ownership and firm performance from three perspectives, i.e. financial measures (Tobin’s Q and return on assets), economic measures (technical efficiency and total factor productivity), and IPO survival duration. Panel data of Taiwanese listed firms from different industries are employed in this study, and the electronics industry is closely examined in particular. It is observed that over the study period the total insider holding ratio remains steady while the executive holding ratio has increased significantly. As to the impact on firm performance, the results of total insider ownership on performance measures are still mixed and contradictory. However, critical resolutions are unveiled after managerial ownership is decomposed. Evidence shows that executive ownership has positive and consistent influences on Tobin’s Q, ROA as well as IPO survivability, and improves efficiency and productivity for the electronics industry. On the other hand, board ownership might not contribute to firm performance at all. Implication is that stock ownership of top officers in Taiwanese firms, especially for the high-tech sector, should be encouraged to enhance overall firm performance.
|Appears in Collections:||Thesis|