Title: 企業社會責任與管理者權力之探討
Essays on the Corporate Social Responsibility and
Authors: 楊縈穗
Yang, Ying-Sui
Chung, Huimin
Lin, Jane-Raung
Keywords: 企業社會責任;公司治理;經理人權力;企業違法事件宣告;事件研究法;Corporate social responsibility;governance mechanism;managerial power;announcement of corporate illegality;event study
Issue Date: 2012
Abstract: 本研究包含兩篇企業社會責任相關議題之論文。第一篇研究主要檢驗管理者受保護時對非持股利害關係人的影響。我們發現經理人對非持股利害關係人有不同程度的關注。當經理人受到較多的保護時,對於與環境相關的利害關係人傾向與其建立良好的關係以補償其所採行負面的行動。這樣的經理人也會試圖降低工作場合中的歧視及不平等待遇;但卻也出現損害員工利益的負面行為。受保護的經理人善盡社會責任會使公司的短期財務績效增加,然而有損利害關係人的行為並不會影響財務績效。第二篇研究調查當公司有負面的CSR事件宣告時,利用事件公司的公司治理機制狀況與短期股價績效之間的關係,探討宣告當時及後續短期內的財富效果。結果顯示在負面的CSR事件宣告後的股價的累積異常報酬為負。因此,本文推論當出現負面的CSR事件時,公司治理機制可緩和負向的累積異常報酬。亦即公司治理較佳的企業對於累積異常報酬有較低的敏感度。然而,迴歸分析結果顯示,負面的CSR事件宣告後使股價的累積異常報酬為負,但公司治理機制的存在並無法減輕因宣告所造成的負向累積異常報酬。
This study contains two essays on the issue of corporate social responsibility. The first essay examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on non-shareholding stakeholders. The results show that managers tend to focus different levels of attention on specific non-shareholding stakeholders relative to their level of entrenchment. When managers have greater protection, they tend to establish good relationships with certain stakeholders, particularly with regard to the natural environment. Well-protected managers attempt to minimize any damage to workforce diversity and often increase the damage to the employees and the natural environment. Furthermore, entrenched managers pay more attention to stakeholders who can have a positive influence on the short-term financial performance of the firm. However, negative social actions have insignificant effect on financial performance. The second essay investigates the wealth effects on firms deriving from the announcements of corporate illegalities and explores the relationship between governance mechanisms and stock price performance of the event firms. The cumulative abnormal returns show that negative wealth effect exists after the announcements of corporate illegalities. We posit that event firms with better governance mechanisms will be less sensitive on cumulative abnormal returns. However, the regression analysis shows that governance mechanisms cannot matter more in a positive way in the announcements of corporate illegalities.
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