標題: 進入雙面市場上的關鍵效應
Keystone Effect on Entry into Two-Sided Markets
作者: 史勁文
Stephen Downing
姜真秀
Kang, Jin-Su
企業管理碩士學程
關鍵字: WiMAX;3G;關鍵效應;雙面市場;流動電訊;two-sided markets;market entry;keystone effect;WiMAX;3G;mobile telecommunications
公開日期: 2011
摘要: We investigate a market entry scenario where a technologically-superior new platform can overcome its installed base disadvantage through its “keystone effect” advantage over the incumbent in a market that also exhibits indirect network effects. This is an application of the ecological keystone species concept to business ecosystems where the effects of keystone species lack empirical quantification. After adapting a dynamic economic model from Zhu & Iansiti (2011) to fit these market conditions, we map a market landscape that shows the internal condition (entrant’s keystone effect) and external conditions (incumbent’s keystone effect and indirect network effects) under which a new platform can successfully enter (i.e., maintain oligopoly or monopoly share) or fail to enter the two-sided market in a winner-takes-all scenario. We then illustrate the model’s applicability by examining the entry of Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) into the mobile telecommunications market in both the United States and the global market, employing recent data from 2009 to 2011. We find that WiMAX’s keystone effect disadvantage and the market’s indirect network effects were cumulatively strong enough to prevent the new technology standard from successfully competing with the incumbent (3G) for oligopoly or monopoly share in the long run.
We investigate a market entry scenario where a technologically-superior new platform can overcome its installed base disadvantage through its “keystone effect” advantage over the incumbent in a market that also exhibits indirect network effects. This is an application of the ecological keystone species concept to business ecosystems where the effects of keystone species lack empirical quantification. After adapting a dynamic economic model from Zhu & Iansiti (2011) to fit these market conditions, we map a market landscape that shows the internal condition (entrant’s keystone effect) and external conditions (incumbent’s keystone effect and indirect network effects) under which a new platform can successfully enter (i.e., maintain oligopoly or monopoly share) or fail to enter the two-sided market in a winner-takes-all scenario. We then illustrate the model’s applicability by examining the entry of Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) into the mobile telecommunications market in both the United States and the global market, employing recent data from 2009 to 2011. We find that WiMAX’s keystone effect disadvantage and the market’s indirect network effects were cumulatively strong enough to prevent the new technology standard from successfully competing with the incumbent (3G) for oligopoly or monopoly share in the long run.
URI: http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079988534
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/51005
Appears in Collections:Thesis