Industry Competition, Agency Problem, and Firm Performance:Evidence from the USA, UK, Germany, and France
|關鍵字:||產業競爭;自由現金流量;公司績效;公司治理;Industry competition;Free cash flows;Firm performance;Country-level governance|
Studies on the relationship between industry competition and firm performance have yet to attain a unanimous conclusion. On the goal of maximizing shareholders’ wealth, the financial literature determines agency problem as an important factor affecting firms. Accordingly, the present study investigates the relationship between industry competition and firm performance in relation to agency problem conditions. At the same time, the literature also stated that the different levels of national corporate governance have different impacts on corporate performance. To confirm this finding, our study focuses on the top four economic markets, including the US, the UK, Germany, and France. We also investigate whether or not the relation between industry competition and firm performance would be different under the different levels of agency problem. Our empirical results show that the positive relation between industry competition and firm performance is relatively significant for firms with higher free cash flows that represent severe agency problems. The results do not change under different levels of national corporate governance.
|Appears in Collections:||Thesis|
Files in This Item: