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dc.contributor.author王世寧en_US
dc.contributor.authorWang, Shin-Ningen_US
dc.contributor.author馮正民en_US
dc.contributor.author康照宗en_US
dc.contributor.authorFeng, Cheng-Minen_US
dc.contributor.authorKang, Chao-Chungen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-12T01:32:03Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-12T01:32:03Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079636507en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/43000-
dc.description.abstractBOT 計畫之權利金與特許年期為涉及BOT 計畫特許契約的重要談判議題,決定適當的權利金與特許年期是避免特許公司獲得暴利或補貼特許公司財務缺口之機制。但目前權利金與特許年期並無合理的依循標準,且過去文獻中較少對於權利金與特許年期之雙議題談判進行研究,因此本研究透過Rubinstein 議價賽局理論構建交通建設BOT 計畫之權利金與特許年期的雙議題談判模式,其有別於過去單議題之談判模式。 首先,本模式依雙方觀點之財務計畫建立出各自談判的底限,再運用談判對象對於兩議題之權重偏好關係決定各自的談判出發點,接著連接雙方談判的出發點,再採取Rubinstein 議價賽局理論的方法,將折現因子、議價成本因子、談判次數、談判能力、談判起始值與談判次數限制等變數納入模式中。最後依此模式找出雙邊連線上之協議點。該協議點即為雙方協議之最適宜權利金與特許年期。 透過本研究之模式,政府與最優申請人可根據各議題權重決定出最適權利金與特許年期的談判結果,以及找出雙邊報酬最大的最佳協議解與報酬最小的最劣解。此外從模式結果亦可明暸議約雙方的談判過程。而本研究之結果可作為BOT談判策略上的參考與決策應用,並且提供主管機關一些BOT 的政策建議。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe royalty and concession period of BOT are important negotiation issues in BOT concession contract. To determine the appropriate royalty and concession period is also a mechanism for a concessionaire to avoid obtaining the windfall or to grant a subsidy for the financial shortfall. However, royalty and concession period do not have a reasonable standard to follow at present, and the both issues of royalty and concession period negotiation model have seldom been explored in the past studies. So this study established the bargaining model for concession period and royalty through the Rubinstein bargaining game theory for transportation BOT projects, which is different from the past single-issue negotiation model. First, the private and public sector's bottom line of negotiations according to their financial plans of their viewpoints was eatablished in the model. Second, their bilateral starting point for negotiations was determined according to their preferences for the weighting of the two issues. Third, Rubinstein bargaining game theory was applied to build up the bargaining model which includes discount factor, bargaining cost, negotiation ability, negotiation starting value, the number of negotiation and the number of negotiation restrictions.The agreement point determined in the model shall be the most appropriate royalty and concession period. Through the model of this study, both the government and the optimal applicant can determinate the most appropriate outcome of the negotiations after weighting each issue, and they can also find the optimal agreement solution of their own largest reward and the worst solution of their smallest reward. In addition, the resulting model enabled a better understanding of the BOT concession negotiation process. Moreover, the study can provide a BOT negotiation strategy for both decision-makers, and even provide administrative department with some BOT policy amendments.en_US
dc.language.isozh_TWen_US
dc.subjectBOT計畫zh_TW
dc.subject特許年期zh_TW
dc.subject權利金zh_TW
dc.subject雙議題談判zh_TW
dc.subjectRubinstein議價賽局理論zh_TW
dc.subjectBOT projectsen_US
dc.subjectConcession perioden_US
dc.subjectRoyaltyen_US
dc.subjectTwo-issue negotiationen_US
dc.subjectRubinstein bargaining game theoryen_US
dc.title交通建設BOT計畫之特許年期與權利金談判模式zh_TW
dc.titleA Concession Period and Royalty Bargaining Model for Transportation BOT projectsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.department運輸與物流管理學系zh_TW
Appears in Collections:Thesis


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