A Study on Network Neutrality: Reconsidering Economic Impact as a Factor in Determining Reasonable Discrimination
|關鍵字:||網路中立;網路差別待遇;端對端;開放網際網路;美國國家通訊委員會;徵收條款;頻寬費用;Net Neutrality;Network Discrimination;End-to-End;Open Internet;Federal Communications Commission;Takings Clause;Bandwidth Costs|
為因應這項新威脅，呼籲透過立法管制業者行為規範的聲浪四起，期能藉以防止業者利用他們新具有的技術能力成為網際網路的看守者。近年來，美國聯邦通訊委員會也已初步研擬了一套規範, 希望能夠化解這些疑慮，但實施這些規範可能面臨一些挑戰。本文將著重於其中一項可能面臨的挑戰－ 第五修正案的徵收條款，其討論重點為如沒有足夠證據證明業者的行為將強力影響網路創新的潛力時，限制業者特定的成本控制或利潤開發的行為，可能會構成第五修正案所為無合理賠償之徵收行為。|
The end-to-end architecture of the Internet has historically resulted in an open network lacking in significant awareness of the nature of the content passing through it. This open architecture has been widely praised for its key role in fostering the unprecedented level of innovation and competition that is evident on the Internet today. However, technological advances in computing have threatened to alter the status quo, giving network providers not only the ability to identify the nature of all content passing through their wires, but also the ability to decide how to treat that content. In response to this new threat, there have been calls to regulate the conduct of network providers, seeking to prevent them from using their newfound capabilities to act as gatekeepers of the Internet. In recent years, the Federal Communications Commission has tentatively introduced a new set of rules, hoping to allay these concerns. However, enforcement of these rules is likely to meet numerous challenges. This paper seeks to highlight one of those challenges in particular – the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It argues that absent significant proof that a network provider’s conduct will significantly affect the innovative potential of the Internet, restrictions on certain cost-controlling or profit-seeking conduct may constitute a taking of property without just compensation.
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