A game-theoretic analysis of the downstream firm-led supply chain
|關鍵字:||二階層供應鏈模型;賽局理論;下游廠商領導;two-echelon supply chain model;game theory;downstream firm-led|
Some evidence appears the downstream retailer plays a dominant role in the supply chain. This study applies a game-theoretic interactive mechanism to analyze the leading effects in a supply chain. The setting of the two-echelon supply chain in our study comprises two members (manufacturers or vendors) in the upstream, which produce their products with some extent of substitutability, and one member (retailer) in downstream. Four interactive models based on game theory are developed: The first model assumes that upstream members are independent and simultaneous to react to the retailer’s decision. The second model represents these two upstream members taking up collusion to respond the downstream action. The third model applies the leader-follower interactive mechanism between the upstream members. The three models above are under the downstream firm-led situation in the supply chain. The fourth model reverses the setting that upstream members act as the leader, which will be contrast with the previous three downstream firm-led models. All these models’ solution processes are applied by backward induction approach of game theory. By applying some numerical examples with different scenarios, there are some findings: (i) As the downstream leader in the supply chain, the retailer gains profit more than the upstream manufacturers. (ii) If the duopolistic manufacturers act in union, they can take back a little of benefits from downstream retailer, however, the downstream member still owns the biggest share of profit. (iii) Applying leader-follower interactive mechanism between upstream members improves their profits, the leader manufacturer may outperform downstream retailer in profit under some condition. (iv) There is drastic change in profit distribution as the leader-follower roles redirection between the downstream and upstream members. (v) Among the downstream firm-led models, consumer surplus and welfare exhibit identical order across cases: Upstream members’ competition facilitates the best welfare, collusion leads to the worst welfare.
|Appears in Collections:||Thesis|