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dc.contributor.author彭聖翔en_US
dc.contributor.authorSheng-Hsiang Pengen_US
dc.contributor.author陳穆臻en_US
dc.contributor.authorMu-Chen Chenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-12T01:18:13Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-12T01:18:13Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT009536512en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/39264-
dc.description.abstract摘要 供應鏈管理 (supply chain management;SCM) 是在全球化及製造業微利化的趨勢下應運而生。在傳統系統下,每個單獨的個體,均以極大化自身之利潤為目標。但供應鏈上每個各體間行為關聯性極強,上游與下游之間資訊與貨物的流通將會影響到整個供應鏈的效率。若能有效整合上中下游,其效率就可達最佳。 本研究欲將賽局理論之觀念應用在供應鏈合約中,以 Krishnan et al. (2004) 提出的零售商促銷努力概念為基礎,將賽局理論加入。本模式為一個供應商與兩個零售商間之兩階段賽局,特色為將零售商對產品之促銷努力 (promotional effort) 及賽局玩家之機會成本 (alternative opportunity cost) 納入模式考量。 模式結果顯示,零售商對產品之促銷努力會受到商品價格、本身庫存量及行銷成本之影響。在訂購量決策方面,零售商對存貨與需求之預測將會透過促銷努力間接影響訂購量,假設此零售商預期本身庫存遠大於顧客需求時,預期零售商勢必會付出更多銷售努力,因此訂貨量也會跟著提升,此結果符合經濟學上預期往往會有自我實現之現象。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractAbstract Supply chain management (SCM) arises from the escalating globalization and the decreasing profit margin. Typically, individual entities maximize their own profit, but behaviors of each entity in the supply chain mutually affect each other. Also, information flow and commodity flow between upstream and downstream companies influence the supply chain’s efficiency. If there is a seamless integration in the supply chain, there exists an optimal Pareto optimality. This study embeds Game Theory in supply contract, and it extends the promotional effort model of Krishnan et al. (2004) additionally with bargaining power, franchisor-franchisee and Game Theory. The formulated model is a two-stage game where one franchisor (supplier) and two franchisees (retailer) take their promotional efforts and alternative opportunity costs into consideration. The results indicate that the market price, inventory and promotion cost are three influential factors determining retailer’s promotional effort. In terms of order quantity, retailer would firstly refer to its expected quantity against the expected range of demand. With this expectation, retailer sets up its adequate effort, and the positive linear relationship between effort and order determine then induces the final order quantity. Therefore, if one retailer expects its order to be enormously larger than the demand it faces, it will exert more effort and order more quantity. This result matches with the phenomenon in economy that expectation has the property of self-fulfillment.en_US
dc.language.isozh_TWen_US
dc.subject供應鏈合約zh_TW
dc.subject賽局理論zh_TW
dc.subject銷售努力zh_TW
dc.subject報童模式zh_TW
dc.subject連鎖企業zh_TW
dc.subjectSupply contracten_US
dc.subjectGame Theoryen_US
dc.subjectpromotional efforten_US
dc.subjectNewsvendor problemen_US
dc.subjectfranchisor-franchisee businessen_US
dc.title考量零售商努力之供應鏈協同賽局zh_TW
dc.titleSupply Chain Coordination Game with Retailer Promotional Efforten_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.department運輸與物流管理學系zh_TW
Appears in Collections:Thesis