標題: Socially optimal and fund-balanced advanced recycling fees and subsidies in a competitive forward and reverse supply chain
作者: Hong, I-Hsuan
Lee, Yi-Ting
Chang, Pei-Yu
工業工程與管理學系
Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
關鍵字: Advanced recycling fee;Subsidy fee;Recycle;Closed-loop supply chain;Competitive entities
公開日期: 1-一月-2014
摘要: Advanced recycling fees (ARFs) and government subsidy fees are important for curtailing the consumption of new products and encouraging recycling and disposal of end-of-life (EOL) products. We introduce a model consisting of a leader (the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA) and two groups of followers (MIS firms and recyclers) consisting of manufacturers, importers and sellers, and recyclers which compete in both consuming and recycling markets. The EPA determines the ARFs paid by the MIS firms and the fees subsidizing recyclers to maximize the social welfare in closed-loop supply chains where the MIS firms and recyclers attempt to maximize their respective profit functions. To compare with current practice, we describe a conceptual fund balance model to determine the ARF and subsidy fee on the basis of the balance between total collected ARFs and expenditure of subsidies. Using numerical examples for the laptop computer market in Taiwan, we demonstrate that our results outperform the current practice. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2013.10.018
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/23858
ISSN: 0921-3449
DOI: 10.1016/j.resconrec.2013.10.018
期刊: RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND RECYCLING
Volume: 82
Issue: 
起始頁: 75
結束頁: 85
顯示於類別:期刊論文


文件中的檔案:

  1. 000331341200009.pdf