|標題:||The venture capital entry model on game options with jump-diffusion process|
Lin, Tyrone T.
Institute of Business and Management
|關鍵字:||Venture capital;Duopoly market;Game options;Jump-diffusion process|
|摘要:||This paper aims to apply game options to construct the optimal decision-making and management tool for venture capital (VC) firms. This model emphasizes the inferences with game options on the market structures formed by different competition and investment strategies of the two VC firms to reflect the investment returns. These market structures are classified into an entry-deterred game (specific monopoly), a leader's dominated strategies (duopoly), and simultaneous investment. It is considered how to select investment timing to avoid any potential competitive threats in order to provide the optimal expected threshold values for the investment decisions of VC firms. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.|
|期刊:||INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS|