Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy with Empirical Research on Taiwan
|關鍵字:||公司治理;企業家精神;股利政策;M-I-T典範架構;結構方程模式;Corporate Governance;Entrepreneurship;Dividend Policy;M-I-T Paradigm;Structural Equation Model|
Corporate governance and corporate policy has been a critical research issue of linking theory and practice. The appeal of corporate governance is nothing but protecting investors and intensifying corporate performance. In past research, dividend policy was a blending topic of the corporate governance research and incentive mechanism. Intending to fill this gap of clearance and cogitation, this paper proposes that the research on corporate governance and dividend policy should be more systematic under the complete structure of Market-Institution-Technology (M-I-T) paradigm. Existing literature links corporate governance with dividend policy, with example of the outcome model which focuses on differentiating international legislation, however, it seldom distinguishes firm with typical features of organization. We identify corporations of Taiwan into two major types: Family firms and Standard firms, with distinguishing features of entrepreneurship leading to different decision makings. With firm-specific entrepreneurial capacity and governance mechanism, our model establishes better structure in explaining corporate performance. The empirical results reveal that performance of two groups are different with aspects of entrepreneurship, decision behavior and governance mechanism. We further analyze these differences making use of the M-I-T paradigm which specifies driving forces and interactions among the market, institution and technology. Family firms depend on institution and government policies; they also create market opportunity through their influence on institution. On the other hand, Standard firms depend on their market innovation insight and knowledge of using the market mechanism. Firms behave based on their own advantages and entrepreneurship when they face with different elements in Market, Institutional and Technological facets that comprise distinct transaction costs. By M-I-T paradigm and structural equation modeling (SEM), this research creates a new systematic model. Recognizing the reality with Taiwan case, we rectify the model problems of disregarding correlation between variables and of lacking systematic model building in traditional financial study. In our model, we create new latent construct variables that present institutional influence and incentive mechanism of dividend policy. We further find out that negative relationship between growth opportunity and dividend policy can be contrasted with Family firms having lower bonding expenditure. In sum, our systematic model helps improve the usual outcome model and generate a brand new sense of corporate governance research.
|Appears in Collections:||Thesis|