Causes and Changes of the Degree of Family Control─Evidence From Taiwan Listed Companies
|Keywords:||家族控股公司;家族控股變動;家族控股指標;控制權;Family Controlled Companies;Changes of Family Controlled Companies;Family Controlled Index;Voting Rights|
|Abstract:||本研究主要貢獻為拉長樣本研究期間以探討台灣上市櫃公司家族性的變化，創造家性族控股指標作為判定家族程度高低的依據，進而探討績效、最終控制者特性、公司特性與台灣上市櫃家族控股公司變動以及家族控股指標之影響。樣本取自1996年底存在上市櫃公司做篩選，參考La Porta et al.（1999）最終控制權股東之衡量方法，判定篩選出226家上市櫃公司，進而分辨企業至2016年最終控制者未變動之公司。進一步探討，家族企業、企業家族性變動(家族控股公司轉變為非家族性公司)、家族性指標3個主要的被解釋變數(虛擬變數)探討所有解釋變數與其之關聯性研究。
The main contribution of this study is to study the changes of Taiwanese family firm during the study period, and to create the family index as the basis for judging the family level, and then explore the performance, the ultimate controller characteristics and the characteristics of the company for Taiwanese family changes and family indicators of the impact. Data from the end of 1996 there are 298 listed companies to do screening, refer to La Porta et al.(1999)the final control of the determination of the use of the ultimate control of the control of shareholders to determine the screening of 226 listed companies, and then distinguish the company which did not change the final controller to 2016. And use three major dependent variables (dummy variables): family firms, changes of degree of family control, family index to explore all of explanatory variables and its relevance. Our empirical results show that when dependent variable was family controlled companies, the greater the manager's internalization ratio, it will increase the probability of chairman is family member. Using the change of family controlled companies as the dependent variable, it was found that board of directors ratio was significantly negative, indicating that when board of directors was reduced, the more likely the chairman who was changed from familial to non-familial member. Under the same dependent variable the explanatory variables is set as the variables data of the previous period, it is found that the greater the deviation between the voting rights and cash flow rights and the smaller the manager's internalization ratio that the chairman is more likely to be changed to non-family member. In addition, when dependent variable is family controlled index, the greater the cash flow right will make greater family controlled index. While the smaller the deviation between the voting rights and cash flow rights, the higher the family controlled index will be. The empirical results show that the final controller characteristic variables have a significant effect on the degree of family control.
|Appears in Collections:||Thesis|