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dc.contributor.authorSheu, Her-Jiunen_US
dc.contributor.authorChung, Huiminen_US
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Chih-Liangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-08T15:19:51Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-08T15:19:51Z-
dc.date.issued2010-11-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn0306-686Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02213.xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/14083-
dc.description.abstractWe set out in the present study to examine the market value of comprehensive disclosure of information relating to the compensation paid to directors and executives. Under the theory of self selection, firms with higher levels of board independence will tend to provide comprehensive disclosure of compensation, thereby leading to lower agency conflicts. Since the authorities in Taiwan chose to adopt a policy of gradual enforcement of compensation disclosure, firms are provided with discretion with regard to any greater levels of transparency that they may choose to provide. We therefore exploit this unique natural experimental setting to examine the effects of compensation disclosure on market value. The evidence indicates that the market provides a higher valuation only to those firms which elect to voluntarily disclose comprehensive information on their compensation practices. However, we also find that even where such disclosure is in excess of the minimum mandatory requirements, lower levels of transparency in the overall disclosure of compensation practices are of very little help with regard to the creation of market value.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectcompensation informationen_US
dc.subjectcomprehensive disclosureen_US
dc.subjectagency conflicten_US
dc.subjectboard independenceen_US
dc.subjectself-selection biasen_US
dc.titleComprehensive Disclosure of Compensation and Firm Value: The Case of Policy Reforms in an Emerging Marketen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02213.xen_US
dc.identifier.journalJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTINGen_US
dc.citation.volume37en_US
dc.citation.issue9-10en_US
dc.citation.spage1115en_US
dc.citation.epage1144en_US
dc.contributor.department交大名義發表zh_TW
dc.contributor.department資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentNational Chiao Tung Universityen_US
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Information Management and Financeen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000285767300004-
dc.citation.woscount5-
Appears in Collections:Articles


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