Title: 管理當局責任保險、控制股東和股權結構
Managerial Liability Coverage, Controlling Shareholders, and Ownership Structure
Authors: 劉政淮
ChiTzu-Ching Weng
Keywords: 控制股東;管理當局利益掠奪;管理當局責任保險;Controlling Shareholder;Managerial Entrenchment;Managerial Legal Liability C overage
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: 國立交通大學
National Chiao Tung University
Abstract: 本研究在探討管理當局利益掠奪(以控制權和現金流量權來衡量)與董監責任保險約定承保程度之關聯性。實證結果發現當公司控制股東與小股東存在較大代理問題時,則較會購買董監事責任保險。此外,我們進一步發現,若控制股東面臨較大訴訟風險時,將傾向購買相對異常較高額度的董監事責任保險承保額度。本文的結果指出當公司傾向透過購買董監事責任保險,來緩和控制股東與外部股東間代理衝突所引起的訴訟風險。
This study investigates whether controlling shareholders with managerial entrenchment, as measured by greater deviation in cash flow and control rights, are associated with managerial liability coverage. Using a sample of director and officer (D&O) liability insurance data, we find that firms with more serious agency conflicts between controlling and outside shareholders are more likely to purchase D&O liability insurance. We also find that controlling shareholders who face greater litigation risk have an incentive to carry abnormally high D&O liability insurance coverage. Our results indicate that an incentive exists to acquire managerial liability coverage against litigation risks arising from incentive conflicts between controlling and outside shareholders.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11536/138288
ISSN: 1023-9863
Journal: 管理與系統
Journal of Management and System
Volume: 23
Issue: 3
Begin Page: 397
End Page: 424
Appears in Collections:Journal of Management and System