|標題:||Earnings Management of Firms Just Meeting Zero-earnings Thresholds: The Stakeholders’ Perspective|
|關鍵字:||利害關係人;避免損失;盈餘門檻;盈餘管理;Stakeholders’ interest；；Avoiding loss；；Earnings threshold；；Earnings management|
National Chiao Tung University
|摘要:||本文以兩項觀點 (公司治理與審計品質將增加監控且降低盈餘管理之觀點，以及分析各利害關係人決策與企業決策關係之觀點)，探討董事長兼任總經理、獨立董監事、機構法人持股與大型會計師事務所查核與零盈餘門檻操控行為之關係。實證結果顯示獨立董監席次比率及機構法人持股比率，皆與零盈餘門檻操控為顯著正相關，而審計品質 (以四大會計師事務所查核衡量) 及董事長兼任總經理則與零盈餘門檻操控間不存在顯著關聯。該實證結果傾向支持由利害關係人決策與企業決策觀點解釋企業零盈餘門檻操控行為。本文並以Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) 之研究設計，發現台灣上市 (櫃) 公司存在會計年度年盈餘分配圖在零盈餘門檻附近存在不連續現象；另估計剛跨越零盈餘門檻公司 (小額正年盈餘公司組) 之實質盈餘管理與異常裁量性應計數，兩項平均值皆不顯著異於零，該結果與本文主張零盈餘門檻操控為小金額損益操控之想法一致。|
This paper aims to examine whether CEO-board chairperson duality, board independence, institutional holding, and audit quality affect earnings management behavior of firms that are just meeting zero-earnings thresholds. The empirical tests are based on the following two perspectives: the perspective that corporate governance and audit quality can constrain earnings management and the perspective of stakeholders’ interests and firms’ decisions. Our empirical findings suggest that firms with a higher proportion of independent board members and higher institutional shareholding are more likely to meet the zero-earnings thresholds through earnings management. However, we find insignificant results for CEO-board chairperson duality and audit quality. In summary, the findings support the perspective of the stakeholders’ interests and the firms’ decisions. In addition, we document the existence of discontinuities around zero-earnings thresholds in earnings distributions based on the methodology of Jacob and Jorgensen (2007). Also, discretionary accrual and real activities manipulation are insignificantly different from zero for firms just meeting zero-earnings thresholds, which supports our assumption that those firms are likely to involve only an insignificant amount of earnings management.
Chiao Da Mangement Review
|Appears in Collections:||Chiao Da Mangement Review|
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