Title: The Impact of Employee Compensation Disclosure on Corporate Governance Structure
員工獎酬資訊揭露對公司治理結構的影響
Authors: 林靜香
王萬成
Ching-Hsiang Lin
Wann-Cherng Wang
Department of Management Science
管理科學學系
Keywords: 員工獎酬;資訊揭露;公司治理;股權結構;Employee compensation;Information disclosure;Corporate governance;Ownership structure
Issue Date: 2010
Abstract: 本文主要探討證期局強制員工獎酬資訊揭露,對公司治理機制中的股權結構、會計資訊在獎酬與績效關聯性監督角色的影響。預期在獎酬資訊揭露前,會計資訊治理功能不彰,股權結構扮演績效與獎酬關聯性重要監督的角色;獎酬資訊揭露後,提升會計資訊治理的功能,此時股權結構監督績效與獎酬關聯性的重要程度降低。 實證結果發現:1.強制獎酬資訊揭露前,大股東持股對績效與獎酬關聯性存在顯著正向的影響;獎酬資訊揭露後,大股東持股監督績效與獎酬關聯性重要程度降低。2.獎酬資訊揭露前,外資機構持股對績效與獎酬關聯性扮演重要監督的角色;獎酬資訊揭露後,外資機構持股監督績效與獎酬關聯性的重要程度降低。3.獎酬資訊揭露前,管理者持股對獎酬政策的影響支持利益掠奪假說,即管理者持股對績效與獎酬關聯性存在負向影響;但強制獎酬資訊揭露無法顯著改善管理者持股對績效與獎酬間負向的影響。進一步發現管理者持股外,若公司同時存在大股東持股或外資機構持股,獎酬資訊揭露使大股東或外資投資機構更容易觀察獎酬決策的制定,提升資訊揭露在降低管理者持股對績效與獎酬關聯性負向影響的治理功能。
Mandatory compensation disclosure can have great impact on the structure of corporate governance. Our empirical results show that mandatory compensation disclosure decreases major stockholders' and foreign investment institutions' importance in overseeing performance-contingent rewards. Also, consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, our findings indicate that managerial stock ownership exerts a negative effect on the link between employee compensation and firm performance and that mandatory information disclosure does not mitigate this negative effect. Compared with regular shareholders, major stockholders and foreign investment institutions are more capable of and
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11536/129087
Journal: 交大管理學報
Chiao Da Mangement Review
Volume: 1
Begin Page: 81
End Page: 119
Appears in Collections:Chiao Da Mangement Review


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