The Effects of Agency Cost on Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Earnings Forecasts
Department of Management Science
|關鍵字:||代理理論;代理成本;自願性盈餘預測揭露;agency theory;agency cost;voluntary disclosue of earnings forecasts|
The purpose of the study is to investigate the effects of agency cost on voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts. The study takes the perspective that in order to win the trust from shareholders and creditors, managers are willing to disclose earnings forecasts voluntarily. Firm size and management’s share holding percentage are adopted to represent the agency cost between managers and shareholders, while leverage represents the agency cost between managers and creditors. Empirical data of 407 listed and OTC companies were obtained from the TEJ data bank in the periord of 1992-2001. The accumulated logistic regression models indicate that the bigger the firm size is, the more willingness of the company is to engage a voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts and the higher the leverage is, the lower the willingness is to a voluntary disclosure. However, there is no significant relationship between management's share holding percentage and voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts.
Chiao Da Mangement Review
|Appears in Collections:||Chiao Da Mangement Review|
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